CSIS continued to observe an evolution of PRC espionage tactics targeting the Canadian public, private, and academic sectors. In 2025, the PRC Intelligence Services (PRCIS), both civilian and military, started posting job ads via cover companies to an expanding number of online job marketing sites to recruit Canadians with access to proprietary or classified information.

The annual report of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service's (CSIS)  highlighted the foreign interference in Canada. 

On China's interference, the report states,  "Rather than only identifying potential targets of recruitment, this approach allows the PRCIS to engage with a much larger number of Canadians, who unknowingly apply to work for a hostile intelligence service."

The report further states that the  PRCIS takes advantage of the financial difficulties and career ambitions that drive some applicants to apply to these job postings. Although most Canadians who apply to these jobs have no direct access to privileged Government of Canada information, providing their resumes and other personal information to the PRCIS may facilitate future targeting of an applicant’s close contacts who could have direct or indirect access to such information. 

In 2025, CSIS released security alerts highlighting PRCIS tradecraft to raise public awareness of these evolving PRCIS tactics. An espionage alert was released on a PRCIS-affiliated individual targeting Canada’s academic research community to disrupt the threat posed by this individual. Over the past two years, CSIS took measures, in coordination with Public Safety Canada and other Government of Canada partners, to successively disrupt the PRC recruitment of current and former Canadian military personnel to train PRC military aviators.